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In Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines,1 the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the Warsaw Conventiona as limiting
international air carriers' liability for tortious injuries to their
passengers to harm recognized under United States' federal
common law based on statute, rather than federal general maritime
law. Specifically, the Court analyzed the Warsaw Convention to
determine if its terms provided guidance on whether loss of society3
1. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934),
reprinted in note-following 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988).
3. Loss of society damages are those damages which, under general maritime
law, embrace a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives
from the other's continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention,
companionship, comfort and protection; thus, widow, parent, brother, sister, or
child may be compensated for loss of society. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1391
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damages are recoverable in an international aviation disaster
occurring on the High Seas. Reversing the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that general
maritime law, which permitted a plaintiff's recovery for loss of
society only if he was the decedent's dependent at the time of the
accident, supplied the substantive compensatory damages law
applicable in an action under the Warsaw Convention.4 Writing for
a unanimous Court, Justice Antonin Scalia noted that where an
international air disaster occurs over the High Seas, the Convention
itself does not resolve the issue as to what harms are compensable,
and a court of competent jurisdiction must instead turn to the
appropriate sovereign's domestic law to make that determination.'
Here, the Supreme Court held that the Death on the High
Seas Act [hereinafter DOHSA],6 is the applicable substantive law.
DOHSA, however, limits recovery to pecuniary damages,7 and as
(6th ed. 1990).
4. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636.
5. Id. at 634-36.
6. Specifically, § 761 of the Death on the High Seas Act provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect
or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the
shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or
dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the
decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the
United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's
wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel,
person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not
ensued.
46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1988).
7. Section 762 of DOHSA provides that recovery pursuant to section 761
"shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the
persons for whose benefit the suit is brought." 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1988).
Pecuniary damages are those damages that can be estimated, in and compensated
by, money; not merely the loss of money or salable property or rights, but all
such loss, deprivation or injury as can be made the subjection of calculation and
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such, the Court disallowed an award to the mother and sister of a
passenger for loss of society.' Significantly, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Warsaw Convention and the concomitant
supplant by DOHSA narrows the scope of the Convention and
places an extraordinary limit on the ability of relatives of victims of
international aviation disasters to recover.
This Note analyzes the Zicherman Court's interpretation of
the Warsaw Convention's provision for damages under Articles- 179
and 240 in determining whether loss of society damages are
recoverable under the Convention. Part II examines the history of
the Warsaw Convention as a means to understand the purpose and
intent of its framers in dafting liability provisions for international
air carriers. Part III addresses the line of cases relied on by the
Second Circuit. Part IV presents the facts of Zicherman, as well as
of recompense in money. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 637.
9. Article 17 of the official English translation of the Warsaw Convention
provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a
passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place
on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 notes.
10. Article 24 limits the provision of Article 17, and provides, in pertinent
part:
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for damages,
however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits
set out in this convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding
paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are
the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective
rights.
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the decisions of the lower courts and the Supreme Court, while Part
V analyzes the Supreme Court's decision. Finally, Part VI
concludes that the Zicherman decision places an extraordinary limit
on the ability of plaintiffs to recover via the Warsaw Convention
and U.S. law for deaths on the High Seas, and the decision leaves
the question of recovery unanswered when the crash occurs on land.
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION: ITS HISTORY AND USE
Preparation for the creation of the Warsaw Convention came
at a time when transportation systems were making great strides
from limited travel by automobile to trans-Atlantic travel by air."
Two international conferences, the first held in Paris in 1925 and
the second in Warsaw in 1929, together with the Comitg
International Technique d'Experts Juridique Agriens [hereinafter
CITEJA], created by the Paris Conference, culminated in the
creation of the Warsaw Convention.l"
The Warsaw Convention was created with two purposes in
mind. First, its Framers envisioned the Convention as a means to
"link many lands with different languages, customs, and legal
systems ...[with] a certain degree of uniformity.""' Thus, the
Convention enabled diverse nations to establish uniform
documentation and procedures for dealing with claims arising out
11. Charles Lindbergh, for example, completed the first nonstop trans-Atlantic
solo flight between New York City and Paris in his single engine monoplane
Spirit of St. Louis on May 20, 1927.
12. For a thorough discussion of the Warsaw Convention history, see Andreas
S. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (1967) [hereinafter Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn]. The following countries participated in the original drafting of the
Convention: the German Reich, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China,
Denmark, Iceland, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland
and the British Dominions, India, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Sweden,
Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1502 notes.
13. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 498.
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of international transportation via air14 and provided specific
provisions for carrier liability.15 The Convention also established
jurisdictional provisions which enabled passengers with claims to
attain jurisdiction over the carrier at its place of business through
which the contract was made, or at the flight's destination.16
Second, and significantly, the Convention provided a means
to limit potential liability of air carriers for injuries to passengers
either in the course of a flight or during embarkation or
disembarkation. 7 However, while Article 17 of the Convention
provided for liability of airlines in the course of international travel,
14. Id. See also Haskell, The Warsaw System and the U.S. Constitution
Revisited, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 483, 484 (1973). The Warsaw Convention
provided a two year period of limitation for claims arising out of the Convention
(Article 29) and provided a standard for liability in which only the actual carrier
providing the transportation was liable for damages caused in the course of the
transportation (Article 30(2)) with respect to passengers. See infra note 15 at arts.
29 and 30(2).
15. For example, Articles 29 and 30(2) provided, in pertinent part:
Article 29
(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought
within two years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or
from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date
on which the transportation stopped.
Article 30(2)
(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the passenger or his
representative can take action only against the carrier who performed the
transportation during which the accident or the delay occurred, save in the
case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability
for the whole journey.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 notes.
16. See supra note 2 at art. 28.
17. See supra note 9 at art. 17.
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it also limited the amount of damages then recoverable to 125,000
"Poincar6 francs."
18
The presumption of liability was a cause of much debate
among nations, as the 1929 Convention seemed to favor air carriers
rather than passengers. Article 20, it was argued, allowed air
carriers to avoid paying damages to their passengers by proving that
they took "all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible... not to take such measures." 19 Those who favored
this limitation justified by it by arguing that the provisions rightly
protected a fledgling airline industry by shielding air carriers from
bearing the burden of liability alone and avoiding litigation by
facilitating out-of-court settlements. Others, however, relied on
the provisions within Article 25, which removed the liability cap
18. See Mendelson and Lowenfeld supra note 10, at 499. This limitation was
equivalent to approximately $4,898 U.S. at the time of the Warsaw Conference
in 1929. Because the poincare franc fluctuated with the gold standard and was
not adjusted for inflation, by 1933, this dollar equivalent was approximately
$8,300 U.S. Id.
19. See supra note 2 at art. 20(1).
20. See Eaton, Recovery for Purely Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw
Convention: Narrow Construction of Lesion Corporelle in Eastern Airlines, Inc.
v. Floyd, 1993 WIs. L. REv. 563, 569 (1993). See also Minutes, Second
International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Oct. 4-12, 1929,
Warsaw, 13, 37-39 (English trans. Homer and Legrez, 1975) (explaining that
such a provision also served to alleviate concerns of potential investors and
insurers of new airlines).
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upon a finding of "willful misconduct '21 by an air carrier.22 It was
not until 1934, shortly after the United States officially became a
party to the Convention,23 that sharp criticism prompted a
rethinking of the limitation on air carrier liability.
24
The parties to the Convention ultimately met in 1955 at the
Hague in the Netherlands, amending the Convention to increase
carrier liability to approximately $16,600 U.S., forming what is
21. Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention reads:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of
this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused
by his willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance
with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to
be equivalent to willful misconduct.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 notes.
22. The result of Article 25 has been an explosion of lengthy litigation to prove
willful misconduct in an effort to circumvent the liability provisions of the
Convention. Naneen K. Baden, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw
Convention, 61 J. AIR L. & CoM. 437, 441 (1995-1996). With respect to willful
misconduct claims under the Warsaw Convention in the United States alone, see
generally, Zicherman, supra note 1; In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland, 37
F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994); Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1992); In re Inflight Exposition on Trans World Airlines, 778 F.Supp. 625
(E.D.N.Y. 1991); Iyegha v. United Airlines, 659 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1995).
23. Interestingly, the United States did not send an official delegate to Warsaw
and failed to participate in the preliminary drafting of the Convention; indeed,
the United States only became a party to the Convention, in 1934. See note
following 49 U.S.C. app § 1502 (1988) at 437. Scholars have pointed to several
reasons for the United States' lack of participation: (1) the lack of international
flights from the United States (in 1929, the only international flights from the
United States were between Key West, Florida, and Havana, Cuba); (2)
preoccupation with the domestic airline industry; (3) the policy of isolationism;
and (4) legal disfavor of limited liability for negligent acts. See EATON, supra
note 20 at 570 n.27.
24. In the United States, for example, the recovery of damages for domestic
flights in personal injury and wrongful death actions greatly exceeded the limits
established by the Warsaw Convention. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
12, at 499.
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referred to as the Hague Protocol.' The United States, however,
concerned that the increase would be ineffective in providing a
sufficient award of damages, refused to ratify the amendment.26
Moreover, due to increasing dissatisfaction with liability limits, the
United States, in 1965, formally announced its denunciation27 of the
Warsaw Convention as a means to protect American passengers.28
25. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Legal Committee, Report
on the Revision of the Warsaw Convention, ICAO International Conference on
Private Air Law, vol. 2 at 96, ICAO Doe. 7686-LC/140 (1956).
26. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12 at 509-46.
27. Denunciation is a legal term of art which refers to a nation's formal
withdrawal from a treaty or convention. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY notes that
the term "denounce" is frequently used in regard to treaties, indicating the act of
one nation in giving notice to another nation of its intention to terminate an
existing treaty between the two nations. The French denoncer means to declare,
to lodge an information against. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed.
1990).
Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention provides a formal process for denunciation:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this
convention by notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of
Poland, which shall at once inform the Government of each of the High
Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of
denunciation, and shall operate only as regards the party which shall have
proceeded to denunciation.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 notes.
28. U.S. Gives Notice of Denunciation of Warsaw Convention, 53 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 923, 923-24 (1965). The notice, in pertinent part, reads:
The United States of America wishes to state that it gives this notification
solely because of the low limits for liability for death or personal injury
provided in the Warsaw Convention, even as those limits would be
increased by the Protocol to amend the Convention done at The Hague on
September 28, 1955 . . . . To this end, the United States of America
stands ready to participate in the negotiation of a revision of the Warsaw
Convention which would provide substantially higher limits, or of a
convention covering the other matters contained in the Warsaw Convention
1996-97]
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However, the following year, in light of the new standard set forth
in the Montreal Agreement,29 which resulted in an increase in air
carrier liability to $75,000 U.S., that notice of denunciation was
withdrawn.3"
While the Warsaw Convention appeared to support the
interests of international air travelers, the ability to recover under
the Convention was initially thwarted and has been the focus of
intense courtroom battles. The United States, for example, only
recognized a cause of action under the Warsaw Convention in 1978
in the Second Circuit opinion in Benjamins v. British European
Airways.3' Analyzing the minutes and documents of the 1925 and
1929 meetings of the Convention delegates, the construction of
Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention, in para materia, and
evidence of how other signatories of the Convention have
interpreted it, the Second Circuit reversed a long line of cases
holding that the Convention itself did not provide a cause of
and Hague Protocol but without limits of liability for personal injury or
death.
Id. at 924-925.
29. Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol,
Agreement C.A.B. 18900, approved by C.A.B. Order No. E-28680, May 13,
1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) (known as Montreal Agreement), reprinted in
49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 notes (1988).
30. Id. Editor's Note: On January 8, 1997, the U.S. Department of
Transportation approved without conditions the International Air Transportation
Association's Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, which waives the
liability limitation found in the Warsaw Convention. See Department of
Transportation Order 97-1-2 (regarding Dockets OST-95-232, OST-9601607) (on
file with law journal). See also Shapiro, U.S. Clears Way for IATA Agreement,
Bus. INS. (Jan. 20, 1997), reprinted in Westlaw, ALLNEWS, 1997 WL
8293579.
31. 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
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action.Y That holding opened the door to the question of what type
of damages are available under the Convention.33
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND APPLICABILITY OF
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Two cases from the Second Circuit, In Re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie, Scotland [Lockerbie 1]34 and In Re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie, Scotland [Lockerbie II]35 provided: (1) that federal
common law supplies the substantive law under which damages may
be claimed; and (2) that recovery depends on whether a plaintiff
was dependent upon the decedent at the time of the air disaster.
These cases formed the basis for the Second Circuit's decision in
Zicherman.
32. 572 F.2d at 917-19. As Judge Lumbard noted:
We do ... believe that the desirability of uniformity in international air
law can best be recognized by holding that the Convention, otherwise
universally applicable, is also the universal source of a right of action. We
do see that uniformity of development can better be achieved by making
federal as well as state courts accessible to Convention litigation. We do
find the opinions of our sister signatories to be entitled to considerable
weight.
Id. at 919.
33. See generally, Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991) (no
liability for purely emotional distress under Article 17); In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.)
[hereinafter Lockerbie I], cert denied, 112 S.Ct. 331 (1991) (punitive damages
not available under the Convention).
34. 928 F.2d. 1267 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
[hereinafter Lockerbie I]
35. 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994). [hereinafter Lockerbie II]
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A. Lockerbie I
Lockerbie I stemmed from the terrorist bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 from London to New York on December 21, 1988 over
Lockerbie, Scotland.36  Surviving relatives and personal
representatives sued Pan American World Airways, two Pan Am
subsidiaries providing security, and Pan Am's parent corporation
for wrongful death, as well as various other claims .3' Following
consolidation of the cases in the Eastern District of New York by
order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, a judgment
was entered finding Pan Am liable.38 A second action was brought
regarding damages, and Pan Am moved for partial summary
judgment on the punitive damages claims, arguing that those claims
were barred by the Warsaw Convention. 39 For purposes of Pan
Am's motion, the district court presumed carrier liability, that the
carrier had committed willful misconduct, and that the applicable
local law permitted recovery of punitive damages. 4° Shortly
thereafter, the court granted Pan Am's motion for partial summary
41judgment on the issue of punitive damages, barring those claims.
The Chief Judge for the Eastern District of New York denied
plaintiffs' motion for reargument, but granted certification under 28
36. 928 F.2d 1267, 1269 (2d Cir. 1991).
37. Id. at 1269.
38. Id. See 733 F. Supp. 547 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).




U.S.C. § 1292(b) 42 for immediate appeal of the case to the Second
Circuit as involving a controlling question of law. 43
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that punitive damages
are not available under the Warsaw Convention, regardless of
whether the airline is guilty of willful misconduct. 44 In reaching
that conclusion, the Second Circuit noted that the Convention
preempts state causes of actions and therefore bars state wrongful
death actions arising under it.45 Moreover, because air carrier
liability is an international dilemma which requires uniform
interpretation, the Convention must be interpreted according to
federal common law, which does not contemplate a punitive
damages claim within a compensatory damages framework.46
1. Preemption of State Causes of Action When
the State Claim Alleged Falls Within the
Scope of the Convention
The Second Circuit noted that although neither the
Convention nor any Congressional action at the time of ratification
expressly preempted state law, various sources supported the
Circuit's conclusion that the Convention itself does not expressly
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides:
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after entry of the order: provided, however, that application for an
appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
43. Id.
44. See 928 F.2d at 1267.
45. Id. at 1273-78.
46. Id- at 1278-80.
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preserve state law causes of action, including caselaw of the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits and other contracting parties to the Convention
including England, Canada, and Australia.47 Importantly, the court
specifically rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Framers of the
Convention meant to leave matters such as the elements of damages
to state law." The use of a single substantive law by such countries
as Australia and Canada supports the view that the Convention does
not preserve any state law causes of action.4 9 The desire for
uniformity, as well as the implications of permitting state law
causes of action, emphasize a reading of the Convention which
forbids construing its text to create a "morass of conflicting
rules. "50 To permit the existence of state causes of action under the
Convention would result not only in "inconsistent application of law
to the same accident, but would also cause enormous confusion for
airlines in predicting the law upon which they would be
called to respond ... [sinking] federal courts into a Syrtis bog
where they would not know whether they were at sea or on good,
dry land . . 151
2. Adopting Federal Common Law
Once the Second Circuit determined that the Convention
preempts state law causes of action arising under it, the question
remained as to what law should be applied in determining the
plaintiffs' claims. The court looked to the source of the right to sue
under the Convention and concluded that the power source was the
Convention itself, noting the federal government's treaty-making
power under the Constitution.5 2 Where the source of the right is
47. Id. at 1273-74.
48. Id. at 1274.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1275.
51. Id. at 1276.
52. Id. at 1278. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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federal law, it follows, then, that the substantive law to be applied
is also federal law.53
The court, by analogy, held that tort law provides the closest
analog from which to determine applicable law,54 finding that
federal common law recognizes a right to recover for a wrongful
death and allows the award of punitive damages, but solely as a
means to punish a defendant and deter certain kinds of conduct.55
The issue then becomes whether the Warsaw Convention permits an
award of punitive damages for the purpose of punishing a defendant
and deterring misconduct.56
3. Shared Expectation of Contracting Parties:
The Second Circuit Rejects an Award of
Punitive Damages
In determining whether punitive damages are available under
the Convention, the court examined the purposes of drafting the
Convention and found that the Convention itself "represents an
entire liability scheme, and... [serves] as a uniform, international
law."'57 Moreover, the terms of the Convention "should be given a
meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting
parties in order to more completely effectuate the Convention's
purposes. ,58
Finally, the court presented a detailed analysis of Articles
17, 24(2), and 25." Importantly, the court noted that Article 17,
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1279-12 (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 298 U.S. 375
(1970)).
56. Id. at 1280.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 1280-88.
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which established a carrier's liability, is limited to compensatory
damages. Determining whether punitive damages were a part of
this calculus depends on the legal meaning of the term "dommage
survenu" 60 and whether it excludes the contemplation of punitive
damages.61 Emphasizing that the translation of "dommage survenu"
as "damage sustained" is the one made by the State Department and
found in the United States Code, as well as the translation used in
1934 when the Convention was ratified by the Senate, the court
found that "the way in which the Convention uses the term indicates
that Article 17 refers to actual harm caused by an accident rather
than generalized legal damages." 62
Next, the court addressed plaintiffs' contention that, based
on Article 24(2),63 regardless of the meaning of "dommage
survenu," the Convention expressly left to local law: (1) the types
of damages recoverable; (2) the issues of contributory negligence;
and (3) the parties to be sued.64 After analyzing the text of Article
24(2), its drafting history, and other commentary, the court rejected
this argument, noting that the drafters' actions lent credence to the
belief that they sought merely to limit recovery to compensation.65
60. Article 17 reads as follows in French, the official language of the Warsaw
Convention:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de
blessure ou de toute autre lesion corporelle subie pau un voyageur lorsque
l'accident qui a cause le dommage s'est produit a bord de l'aeronef ou au
cours de toutes operations d'embarquemet et de debarguement.
The term "dommage survenu" is interpreted in the English translation, as set
forth in the United States Code as "damage sustained." See supra note 9 at 49
U.S.C. app. § 1502 note.
61. Id. at 1280.
62. Id. at 1281.
63. See supra note 10 for the text of Article 24.
64. Id. at 1282.
65. Id. at 1282-85.
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Finally, the court addressed whether Article 25's willful
misconduct provisions contemplated the recovery of punitive
damages.66 The court noted that "Article 17 is not one of the
limitations or exclusions to which Article 25 refers; Article 25
voids only certain provisions in the event of willful misconduct, but
ihe rest of the Convention remains fully operative ..."67 The
court further rejected plaintiffs' arguments that Article 25's removal
of the liability cap in cases of willful misconduct eliminates any and
all limitations on damages.68 Moreover, the court refused to
acknowledge that construing Article 17 in such a manner limits
plaintiffs' recovery by creating a cause of action for compensatory
damages and simultaneously preempts state causes of action
allowing for punitive damages.69
Instead, the court, analyzing various commentary on the
construction of the Convention and referring to the policy
considerations behind the Convention, concluded that to allow
punitive damages would conflict with the Framers' vision of the
Convention.70 Punitive damages were not to be had under the
Convention.
B. Lockerbie II
Following the Second Circuit's decision in Lockerbie I
denying recovery of punitive damages, a jury awarded
compensatory damages in three plaintiffs' cases, which formed the
basis of Pan Am's appeal in Lockerbie ii.71 Pan Am appealed the




70. Id. at 1286. Indeed, the Court recognizes that "the award of full
compensatory damages alone is sufficient to deter willful misconduct, so punitive
damages would be both excessive and redundant." Id. at 1285-86.
71. 37 F.3d 804, 811 (2d Cir. 1994).
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trial court's exclusion of evidence not heard or considered by the
jury relating to Pan Am's and its subsidiaries' alleged
noncomplicance with security regulations concerning
unaccompanied baggage. It also appealed the admission of evidence
showing other alleged misconduct by Pan Am, coupled with the
disallowance of defense testimony concerning alternate theories of
causation, various other evidentiary rulings, and the legal bases for
the damage awards.72
For the purposes of this Note, the bases for the damage
awards under the Convention are significant. Specifically, in each
of the three cases whose damage phases were tried, the jury was
permitted to award compensatory damages to the decedent's spouse
and children based on loss of financial contributions, loss of
services, loss of society and companionship, and loss of parental
care.73 However, on appeal, Pan Am argued that under the Warsaw
Convention, loss of society and companionship damages are not
available, and that damages for loss of parental care should not be
available to adult children of crash victims where there is no
showing of dependence.
74
The Second Circuit referred to its decision in Lockerbie I,
noting that damages in a Warsaw Convention case are governed by
general federal maritime common law principles consistent with the
terms of the Convention. 75 Article 17 provides for recovery of
compensatory damages .76 Following the reasoning of Lockerbie I,
to determine whether damages for loss of society and
companionship are recoverable under the Convention, the court
72. Id. at 812.





examined federal maritime law, "probably the oldest body of
federal common law. ""
Applying federal maritime law based on statute, Pan Am
argued that the court should look to the Death on the High Seas
Act78 and the Jones Act,79 which preclude recovery for loss of
society damages. 8 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that
general maritime law cases that are not bound by a statutory
restriction allow recovery for loss of society.81 Interestingly, the
court noted that a distinguishing feature in those cases which
precluded loss of society damages under DOHSA and the Jones Act
has been that damages are limited to pecuniary loss.8
Accordingly, to resolve the conflict between statutory cases,
which deny loss of society, and general maritime cases, which
permit recovery of damages for loss of society, the court again
turned to the text of Article 17.83 First, the court noted that the
analysis of Article 17 must be evaluated by examining the
governing text as drafted in French. 84 Citing Lockerbie I, the court
noted that the English translation of Article 17's compensation for
"dommage survenu" is "damage sustained" and that no reference to
77. Id. (citing In re Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400, 414-415 (9th Cir.
1983) (looking to general federal maritime law in holding that the Warsaw
Convention creates a cause of action for wrongful death)).
78. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1988).
79. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
80. Lockerbie II, 37 F.3d at 828-29. See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
498 U.S. 19, 31-33 (1990).
81. Lockerbie II, 37 F.3d at at 829. See, e.g., American Export Lines, Inc.
v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 280-83 (1980); Sea-Land Services, Inc., v. Gaudet, 414
U.S. 573, 585-88 (1974).
82. Lockerbie II, 37 F.3d at 829.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534-35 (1991);
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)).
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pecuniary loss appears in the text.85 Moreover, the court explained
that "the aim of the Convention's drafters and signatories appears
from the simple language of the text to provide full compensatory
damages for any injuries or death covered by the Convention."
8 6
However, nothing in French law supported limiting "dommage
survenu" to exclude loss of society awards.87
Indeed, in light of the broad language in the Warsaw
Convention for "damage sustained" and a lack of authority
supporting a limitation of compensatory damages to pecuniary loss,
the court turned to the principles of general maritime law under
Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet88 and its progeny, holding that the
Warsaw Convention permits damage awards for loss of society and
companionship.8 ' Those cases allowed spouses to recover loss of
society, permitting dependents as well as spouses to recover
damages.' ° Where no maritime law extended loss of society
damages to plaintiffs other than spouses and decedents, the court
declined to award damages to those relatives who were not
dependent upon family members killed during the crash, and the
Second Circuit remanded the case to the lower court for a




88. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
89. Lockerbie II, 37 F.3d at 829-30.
90. Id. at 829-30.
91. Id.
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IV. ZICHERMAN V. KOREAN AIR LINES92
A. The Facts
On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines [hereinafter KAL]
Flight 007 from New York to Seoul, South Korea, strayed into
Soviet airspace and was shot down over the Sea of Japan.93 All of
the passengers perished, including Muriel Kole. 94 Zicherman and
Mahalek, the surviving mother and sister of Kole, brought suit in
the Southern District of New York to recover damages. 95 All
federal court cases arising out of the KAL disaster were transferred
in 1983 to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation for
coordinated and consolidated proceedings on the common liability
issues.96
The common liability issues, including whether the
destruction of Flight 007 by Soviet military aircraft was
proximately caused by the "willful misconduct" of KAL or its
employees, within the meaning of Article 25 of the Warsaw
Convention, and whether punitive damages are recoverable, were
tried to a jury in the District of Columbia. 97 There, the jury found
that the passenger's deaths were caused by the willful misconduct
92. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 807 F.Supp. 1073
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), sub. nom. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 43 F.3d 18 (2d
Cir. 1994), 116 S.Ct. 629 (1996).
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of the flight crew and assessed punitive damages against the
airline.
9 8
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld
the jury finding of willful misconduct, but vacated the punitive
damage award, holding that the Warsaw Convention does not
permit the recovery of punitive damages.' Both plaintiffs and KAL
filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied by the
Supreme Court on December 2, 1991.1°°
Once the common liability issues were determined, the cases
were remanded to the original transferor courts for the trial of
issues relating to compensatory damages, such as the type and by
whom they are recoverable.1"'
B. The District Court's Decision
The Southern District of New York addressed whether
compensatory damages sought by the plaintiffs, Kole's mother and
sister in their individual capacities, and by her sister as executrix of
Kole's estate for the benefit of the estate and its beneficiaries, were
recoverable under the Warsaw Convention, or, in the alternative,
under DOHSA.'O° Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to recover both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses under the Warsaw Convention
or pecuniary losses under DOHSA.° 3
The plaintiffs argued that the Warsaw Convention created a
cause of action for injuries sustained in favor of any person who has
suffered any loss, regardless of whether such loss was pecuniary or
98. Id. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475
(D.C.Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 616 (1991).
99. Id.
100. Id. See Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991).
101. Id. at 1077.
102. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073,
1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
103. Id. at 1077.
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non-pecuniary." 4 Kole's mother sought damages for mental
anguish and grief associated with her daughter's death, as well as
loss of love, affection and companionship." 5 Kole's sister sought
damages for the same losses in her individual capacity, and as
executrix of her sister's estate, for conscious pain and suffering
before her death on the plane; loss of quality or enjoyment of life;
loss of support; loss of services; and loss of inheritance for herself
and her mother. 1o6
The defendants, on the other hand, argued that plaintiffs
were limited to an action brought by the estate for wrongful death
caused by the airline disaster, a cause of action specifically provided
for under DOHSA, which limits recovery to pecuniary losses.10 7
The defendants further contended that DOHSA, enacted by
Congress in 1920, specifically provided for a remedy in admiralty
for the dependent survivors of seamen for wrongful death on the
High Seas, and it is applicable only when the death occurs on the
High Seas more than a marine league (three miles) from the shore
of any state, the District of Columbia, or any territory of the United
States. 1 8 DOHSA has been construed by the U.S. Supreme Court
to limit dependent survivors' losses to pecuniary ones.10 9
Before addressing the plaintiffs' claims for damages, the
district court responded to the defendant's motion to dismiss Muriel
Mahalek as a party plaintiff suing in her own right, under a theory
that DOHSA permits only the decedent's estate to bring a wrongful





108. Id. (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 622-23,
reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 884 (1978)).
109. 806 F. Supp. at 1077.
110. Id. at 1080.
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noted that Article 24(2) of the Convention provides that suit for
"damages sustained" may be brought "however founded" and
"without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who
have the right to bring suit.""' Accordingly, the district court
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss Mahalek as a party
plaintiff.
Next, the district court addressed the plaintiffs' damages
claim in seriatim. 112 The plaintiffs' damages claims fell into three
categories: (1) claims for a survival action on behalf of the
decedent's estate; (2) damages for wrongful death (both pecuniary
and nonpecuniary); and (3) personal damages.
113
1. The Survival Action
The district court first addressed damages recoverable in
terms of a survival action on behalf of the decedent's estate,
including decedent's pain and suffering, loss of the enjoyment of
life, and future lost earnings."'
The district court denied defendant's motion to limit
plaintiff's recovery to pecuniary losses sustained by decedent's
dependent survivors." 5 Recognizing the Supreme Court's earlier
decision that damages under the Warsaw Convention are not
recoverable where the injury is caused by anxiety or shock when
unaccompanied by physical injury,' 16 the court concluded that where
physical injury results, passengers may bring a cause of action
under the Convention for those injuries.' 7 Further, other courts,
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1080-89.
113. Id. at 1080.
114. Id. at 1080-84.
115. Id. at 1080.
116. See generally, Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
117. Zicherman, 807 F. Supp. at 1081.
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following Lockerbie I, have recognized plaintiffs' rights to recover
damages for the pain and suffering of passengers injured or killed,
because recovery for such conscious pain and suffering redresses
actual harm, "dommage survenu," as required by the Warsaw
Convention." 8 Moreover, the district court noted that there is "no
federal statutory or common law bar to the survival action brought
by decedent's estate . . . to recover damages for decedent's
conscious pain and suffering prior to her death. "119
The court also rejected the defendant's motion to preclude
the expert testimony regarding decedent's conscious pain and
suffering prior to her death, noting that it was relevant.
12
Additionally, plaintiffs sought damages for the loss of
enjoyment of life as part of the survival action on behalf of the
decedent's estate. 121 The plaintiffs argued that federal courts have
allowed such damages as "hedonic" damages, that is, those damages
affecting one's ability to enjoy the "normal pursuits and pleasures
of life."122 The district court, however, rejected their request for
damages for the loss of the quality or enjoyment of life of the
decedent. The court noted that in cases where hedonic damages
were recoverable, the plaintiffs sued on their own behalves, for
injuries suffered during their lifetime.123
The defendant moved to deny recovery for lost future
wages, arguing that Supreme Court precedent precludes recovery
118. Id. (referring to In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, 778
F.Supp. 625 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other grounds 975 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.
1992)).
119. 807 F. Supp. at 1081.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Hedonic damages refer to damages for the loss of the enjoyment of life
as affected by physical pain and suffering, physical disability, impairment and
inconvenience affecting an individual's normal pursuits and pleasures of life. Id.
at 1081, n.7.
123. Id. at 1083.
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of future lost earnings by decedent's relatives." 4 Although the
district court found that the Supreme Court's decision in Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp.,125 regarding damages recoverable by a
seaman's estate was not direct precedent, it nevertheless found the
Court's reasoning persuasive.126 Accordingly, the court denied
recovery for future lost earnings, emphasizing that to allow
recovery would be tantamount to double recovery, and any award
received would be subject to reduction by the amounts required by
the decedent for her own support and income taxes. 127
2. The Wrongful Death Action
Plaintiffs, in support of their wrongful death action, sought
damages for loss of support; their mental injury and grief; and loss
of love, affection, and companionship. 28
The court found that the plaintiffs could recover for loss of
support. 129 The court recognized that most states allow recovery in
the form of loss of support, rather than for future lost wages, when
there are beneficiaries. 130
Regarding plaintiffs' mental injury and grief, the court found
that wrongful death recovery generally has been extended only to
cover pecuniary damages which are measurable.13 ' The exception
to the rule precluding recovery for grief occurs when a survivor's
124. Id.
125. 498 U.S. 19 (1990) (no recovery for lost earnings beyond a seaman's
lifetime).
126. 807 F. Supp. at 1084.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1084-88.
129. Id. at 1084.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1085.
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damages extend beyond mere grief to actual mental injury, or the
aggravation of a pre-existing physical injury.132 Where damages are
due to mental injury and are associated with physical injury, they
are "damages sustained" as set forth under the Convention. 33 As
the knowledge of KAL's "willful misconduct" is a factor in
assessing plaintiffs' present actual mental injury, the court rejected
the defendant's motion to preclude any mention of willful
misconduct, as found by the liability jury.'34
Finally, Kole's survivors, as plaintiffs sought recovery for
their loss of Kole's love, affection and companionship. 35
Defendants, on the other hand, argued that loss of society,
(covering the same grounds) is not recoverable under DOHSA, and
that the Supreme Court's decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. 136
precludes recovery. 37 However, the court held that the Convention
provides for damages sustained, "actual harm experienced, whether
physical injury to the passenger or, in the case of death, monetary
or other loss to his survivors" as well as Fifth Circuit caselaw,
which allowed damages for loss of love and affection in cases
brought under the Warsaw Convention. 138
Moreover, the Court found that because the Second Circuit
in Lockerbie determined that federal common law applies in
interpreting the Warsaw Convention, the measure of damages
available under the Convention is also governed by federal law.' 39
132. Id. at 1085-86.
133. Id. at 1086.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
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Allowing survivors who are close family members of
passengers to recover damages for loss of love, affection, and
companionship, when proved, serves the underlying purposes and
goals of the Convention, especially where the Convention provides
not only for full compensation for victims but also for anyone who
can prove damages sustained as a result of the crash."'4
Accordingly, the court declined to impose a dependency
requirement on those seeking benefits, noting that a close relative
who has suffered injury may be compensated. 141
3. Loss of Inheritance and Loss of Services
Lastly, the court found that loss of inheritance, although not
specifically sought by the plaintiffs, were recoverable in most
jurisdictions and permitted by federal common law. 142 In addition,
the court found that damages for loss of services, where the value
of services lost is measurable, were recoverable. 4 3 Defendants
agreed that loss of inheritance is recoverable and did not contest
recovery for loss of services.'44
In sum, the district court found that plaintiffs may recover
for decedent's conscious pain and suffering; loss of support, mental
injury and grief, loss of love, affection, and companionship; loss of
inheritance; and lost services.' 45
C. The Second Circuit's Decision
Korean Air Lines appealed from the judgment entered by the
Southern District of New York on April 12, 1993, following a jury
140. Id. at 1087-88.
141. Id. at 1088.
142. Id. at 1088-89.




verdict which awarded damages of $251,000 to Marjorie Zicherman
and $124,0004' to Muriel Mahalek and which granted prejudgment
interest on the award, discounted by two percent per annum to the
date of the accident. 147
KAL based its appeal on four arguments: (1) federal
maritime law precludes plaintiffs' recovery for loss of society; (2)
federal maritime law precludes plaintiffs' recovery for mental
injury of grief; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain an award
to Zicherman as executrix of Kole's estate for Kole's conscious pain
and suffering; and (4) the evidence was also insufficient to sustain
an award to Zicherman for loss of support and loss of inheritance."4
Zicherman and Kole cross-appealed the court's discounting of
prejudgment interest. 
149 -
The Second Circuit affirmed the award for pain and
suffering as well as the district court's calculation of prejudgment
interest.150 However, the awards for mental injury and for
146. The awards were broken down as follows:
Mahalek
1. Mental injury $96,000
2. Loss of society $28,000
Zicherman (personal capacity)
3. Mental injury $65,000
4. Loss of society $70,000
5. Loss of support $ 5,000
6. Loss of inheritance $11,000
Zicherman (as executrix of Kole's estate)
7. Kole's pain and suffering $ 100,000
43 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Mahalek's loss of society were vacated.' The awards for
Zicherman for loss of society, loss of support, and loss of
inheritance were reversed and remanded.15
1. Recovery for Loss of Society
In reviewing KAL's claims that federal maritime law
precludes plaintiffs' recovery for loss of society, the Second Circuit
turned to its decision in Lockerbie I, noting that the Warsaw
Convention provides an exclusive cause of action.'53 Emphasizing
that the Convention is silent on the question of damages, the court
looked to federal law to decide the issues.154 In doing so, the
Second Circuit rejected KAL's argument that because Flight 007
was shot down over non-territorial waters, the applicable law is
DOHSA, which expressly limits recovery to pecuniary loss.
155
Instead, the court noted that in Lockerbie I, the federal common law
governs causes of action under the Warsaw Convention, and that in
Lockerbie II, damages under the Convention should be determined
by maritime law.156
Reiterating the holding of Lockerbie II, the court emphasized
the discrepancies in recovery under either general federal maritime
law or federal maritime law based on statute. The court recognized
that while two maritime statutes, DOHSA and the Jones Act,
preclude recovery for non-pecuniary loss, general maritime cases
not brought under such statutory restrictions allow recovery."'
Based on the language and underlying policies of the Convention,
151. Id.
152. Id.






however, the court concluded that compensatory, non-pecuniary
damages are appropriate, and accordingly, under general maritime
principles, the Warsaw Convention permits recovery for loss of
society.158
The Second Circuit rejected KAL's argument distinguishing
the holdings of the Lockerbie cases, where the accidents occurred
on dry land, from the KAL disaster, which occurred over water.159
To construct one rule for Convention cases occurring over water
and another for those occurring over land would defeat the purpose
of uniformity.1 6  The Court noted that it "cannot reconcile
DOHSA's limitation of damages to pecuniary loss with the 'aim of
the Convention's drafters and signatories . . . to provide full
compensatory damages for any injuries or death covered by the
Convention,' including non-pecuniary loss., 161 Accordingly, the
Court found that to maintain uniformity under the Warsaw
Convention, general maritime law, rather than DOHSA, is more
appropriate.1 62
Federal maritime law, in turn, allows recovery for loss of
society only for dependents.163 While this bright-line rule may
unfairly deny recovery for some deserving parties, the Court noted
that the decision is rational and efficient. 64 Under the rule of
Lockerbie II, which extended to Convention cases the general
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plaintiffs may recover only if they can establish that they were
Kole's dependents at the time of her death. 
165
KAL argues that, as a matter of law, Mahalek may not
recover loss of society damages, because she failed to offer
evidence to support a claim of dependency. 166 Further, Mahalek
specifically conceded on cross-examination that she was not
financially dependent on Kole. 167  Because no jury could find
Mahalek entitled to recover damages as a dependent, the court
reversed and vacated the award to Mahalek for loss of society.16 8
Similarly, KAL argues that the evidence submitted by Zicherman,
in the form of testimony that Kole gave her general financial
assistance, is insufficient to establish the test for dependency; where
the record does not establish that Kole in fact financed the purchase
of a house, the Court reversed and remanded the award of loss of
society damages to Zicherman, pending trial on that issue.
169
2. Damages for Grief or Mental Injury
The court next addressed the issue of whether plaintiffs may
recover additional damages for their grief or mental injury, as
awarded by the district court, which reasoned that the Warsaw
Convention permits recovery for "damages sustained" and that
mental injury or grief of surviving relatives is one such type of
damage. 7 ° The Second Circuit disagreed with the trial court,
noting that under Lockerbie II, federal maritime supplies the
165. Id. Dependency is the existence of "a legal or voluntarily created status
where the contributions are made for the purpose and have the result of
maintaining or helping to maintain the dependent in [her] customary standard of
living." Id. (citing Petition of United States, 418 F.2d 264, 272 (1st Cir. 1969)).




170. Id. at 23.
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measure of damages for injuries arising out of accidents governed
by the Warsaw Convention.' Federal maritime law does not
permit surviving relatives to recover damages for mental injury or
grief in addition to damages for loss of society. 72 Accordingly, the
awards to Zicherman and Mahalek for mental injury were reversed
and vacated. 173
3. Pre-death Pain and Suffering
The court rejected KAL's argument that Zicherman, as
executrix, failed to provide specific evidence from which the jury
could infer that Kole: (1) survived the missile explosions; (2) was
conscious and aware for a period of time; (3) and experienced pain
and suffering. 74 Because it would be impossible to produce such
evidence, expert testimony is sufficient such that the jury could
reasonably infer Kole's pre-death pain and suffering; thus, the court
affirmed the award.' 75
4. Loss of Support and Loss of Inheritance
Damages for loss of support and loss of inheritance are
recognized wrongful death remedies under maritime law.
176
However, the award of such remedies has been conditioned upon a
showing of full or partial dependency. 177 Consequently, the court
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and loss of inheritance for determination of the issue of
dependency. 
178
5. Discount of Prejudgment Award
Finally, the Second Circuit noted that the calculation of
prejudgment interest is a discretionary matter for the district
court. 179 Here, where the district court discounted a jury verdict
rendered in 1992 for an accident which occurred in 1983, and
where the verdict may have reflected the inflationary impact of the
intervening nine years, the discount is not an abuse of its
discretion. 8 o
D. The Supreme Court's Decision
Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Zicherman, on behalf of the Petitioners, filed a petition for
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, arguing
that dependency, under either common law or general maritime law
based on statute, is not a requirement for loss of society damages
under the Warsaw Convention.181 Respondents KAL responded and
filed a cross-appeal, arguing that nonpecuniary damages for loss of
society are not recoverable under the Warsaw Convention because
the national law of each contracting party determines which
damages are recoverable. In addition, where the aviation disaster
occurs on the High Seas within the meaning and scope of DOHSA,
damages are limited only to pecuniary losses. 182
178. Id.
179. Id. at 24.
180. Id.
181. Brief for the Petitioners/Cross-Respondents at 7, Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines, 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996) (Nos. 94-1361, 94-1477).
182. Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 12-15, Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines, 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996) (Nos 94-1361, 94-1477).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari, framing the issue as
whether, in a suit brought under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention governing international air transportation, a plaintiff
may recover damages for loss of society resulting from the death of
a relative in a plane crash on the High Seas. 83
1. The Plain Meaning of Article 17
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, first turned to
Article 17 to determine whether it provided any indication as to the
types of damages provided for under the Convention's terms.
18 4
From the outset, the Court noted that the English word "damage"
or "harm," or in the official French text "dommage," could be
applied to a wide range of phenomena, "from the medical expenses
incurred as a result of Kole's injuries (for which every legal system
would provide tort compensation), to the mental distress of some
stranger who reads about Kole's death in the paper (for which no
legal system would provide tort compensation. "" To allow the use
of the term in its broadest sense would explode tort liability beyond
what any legal system in the world allows.18 6 Accordingly, the
Court refused to simply look to English dictionary definitions of
"damage" and apply "plain meaning. ""7
Rejecting the Petitioners' suggestion to look to the dictionary
definition of the term, the Court noted that there were two
alternatives.' 88  One alternative to Article 17's meaning of
"dommage" might be to look to the term's meaning under French
183. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 116 S. Ct. 629, 631 (1996).
184. Id. at 632.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing Petitoners' Brief at 7-9).
188. 116 S. Ct. at 632.
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law dating from 1929, when the Convention was drafted.'89 The
Petitioners suggested that French law in 1929 recognized not only
"dommage material," pecuniary harm, but also "dommage moral,"
nonpecuniary harm encompassing loss of society.'9o However, the
Court referred to its previous rejection of a broad meaning of the
term "damage," noted that the question is not whether the Court
will be guided by French legal usage, but "whether the word
'dommage' establishes as the content of the concept 'legally
cognizable harm' what French law accepted in 1929. "191 The Court
noted that no United States Supreme Court case has ever provided
for adopting French law in such a detailed manner; indeed, where
the Court looked to the French language for the meaning of the
term, it did not inquire how French courts would resolve the
question, but instead "made that judgment for [itself]. "'"  The
Court acknowledged that in the case at hand, it would have been
unlikely that the parties to the Convention "would have understood
Article 17's use of the general term 'dommage' to require
compensation for elements of harm recognized in France but
unrecognized elsewhere, or to forbid compensation for elements of
harm unrecognized in France but recognized elsewhere. "19 Many
nations who are signatories, including Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Germany, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and Sweden, did not,
years after the Warsaw Convention, recognize a cause of action for
nonpecuniary harm resulting from wrongful death. '
The Court noted that the other alternative, and the one it
considered most realistic, was that "dommage" refered to "legally
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 632-33.
192. Id. at 633 (referring to its decisions in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S.
530 (1991) (narrowly construing the term "lesion corporelle" in Article 17) and
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) (interpreting the word "accident")).




cognizable harm" and that Article 17 leaves it to adjudicating courts
to determine what harm is specifically cognizable. 195 Moreover, the
Court acknowledged that such an interpretation is not unusual,
enumerating examples within domestic law which provide generally
for "damages" or reimbursement for "injury," but leave the
question of what types of harms are compensable to the courts.196
2. The Limitation of Article 17 by Article 24
The Court's preference for the second alternative is
supported by an in para materia reading of the Convention. 97
Article 17's provisions are expressly limited by Article 24.198 The
Court noted that the most natural reading of Article 24 is that, in an
action brought under Article 17, the law of the Convention should
not be read to affect the substantive questions regarding who may
bring suit and for what compensation.199 Petitioners' reading of
Article 24 would be awkward at best: 1929 French law as set forth
in the Convention would determine what harms arising out of
international air disasters must be indemnified, while current
domestic law would determine who is entitled to the indemnity and
how it is to be divided among claimants.2"0 Such a reading is
inappropriate where the more comprehensible result is that the
Convention leaves to domestic law the questions of who may
recover and what compensable damages are available.2 1
195. Id.
196. Id. (referring to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988), the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), and various state statutes).
197. 116 S. Ct. at 633.
198. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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3. The Convention's Negotiation, Drafting
History, and Post-Ratification Conduct of the
Contracting Parties
The Court next turned to the negotiation and drafting
history, or "travaux preparatoires," and the post-ratification
understanding of the contracting parties to determine the appropriate
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention.2' 2 These
sources confirmed the Court's finding that compensable injury must
be determined according to domestic law.20 3 First, the Court
examined the statements made by the Comite International
Technique d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens, which produced the
preparatory work culminating in the Warsaw Convention.2 4
Importantly, the Court noted that the CITEJA's report of May 15,
1928 acknowledged that determining the types of damages subject
to reparation is a difficult one in that "it was not possible to find a
satisfactory solution before knowing exactly the legislation of the
various countries. "'25 In fact, the CITEJA report accompanying the
1929 draft of the Convention emphasized that the question of what
persons had a cause of action under the Convention and the types
of damages subject to reparation is a "question of private
international law [which] should be regulated independantly [sic]
from the present Convention. ,206 The Court also noted that the
questions of who may recover and the compensatory damages
recoverable are intertwined, and that the framers of the Convention,
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. See also note 12, supra, and accompanying text.
205. Id. (citing Report of the Third Session by Henry de Vos, CITEJA
Reporter (May 15, 1928), reprinted in International Technical Committee on
Legal Experts on Air Questions 106 (May 1928)).
206. 116 S. Ct. at 635. (citing Report of the Third Session of CITEJA by Henry
de Vos (Sept. 25, 1929)), reprinted in Second International Conference on




unable to resolve these issues, sought to leave them to the private
international law arena.20 7
Also, the conduct of the contracting parties to the
Convention following ratification demonstrates the understanding
that the damages recoverable for harm incurred are to be
determined by domestic law.2"8 England, Germany, and the
Netherlands, for example, have adopted domestic legislation
governing the types of damages recoverable in a Convention case. 9
Canada, on the other hand, has adopted legislation setting forth who
may bring suit under Article 24(2), but has left the question of the
type of damages recoverable to provincial law. 210 The Court of
Appeals of Quebec has specifically rejected the argument that
Article 17 allows damages unrecoverable under the domestic law of
Quebec. 21' Finally, the Court noted that expert commentators have
been virtually unanimous in their view that the type of harm
compensable is to be determined by domestic law.212
4. Choice of Law Issues
Once the Court decided that compensable harm is
determined by domestic law, the next question was which
sovereign's domestic law is applicable.2 3 However, resolution of
that thorny issue was not necessary, as the parties agreed that if the




211. Id. (citing Dame Surprenant v. Air Canada, [1973] C.A. 107, 117-8, 126-
7 (Ct.App. Quebec) (opinion of Deschenes, J.)).
212. 116 S. Ct. at 635.
213. Id.
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issue of compensable harm is not resolved by the Convention itself,
then it is governed by United States' law.214
Accordingly, the Court looked at which particular law of the
United States provided guidance on the issue of compensable
harm.215 Significantly, the Court rejected the Second Circuit's
notion of the need to maintain a uniform law when it held that
general maritime law governed causes of action under the
Convention, regardless of whether the accident out of which they
arise occurs on land or on the High Seas.216 Indeed, the Court
emphasized that the Convention itself contains no such rule of law
governing the question at hand.21 Moreover, the Convention does
not empower the Court to devise a common law rule "under cover
of general admiralty law or otherwise ... [which would] supersede
the normal federal disposition. 212 The Court noted that such
legislation may be fashioned by Congress, following other
contracting nations.219 However, where such legislation does not
exist, the Convention offers little assistance: "Articles 17 and 24(2)
provide nothing more than a pass-through, authorizing [the Court]
to apply the law that would govern in absence of the Warsaw
Convention. "220
The applicable domestic law in this case is DOHSA."' The
death at issue here falls within the literal terms of the provision, and
the Court noted that the law is clear that DOHSA's terms apply to
214. Id.






221. Id. See 46 U.S.C. app § 761 (1988).
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airplane crashes. 2 2 Under DOHSA, the petitioners may not recover
loss of society damages. 223 Moreover, where DOHSA applies,
neither state law nor general maritime law provides a basis for loss
of society damages .224
The Court rejected Petitioners' argument that DOHSA
should not apply because of the need for uniformity when
addressing Convention cases. 2z In fact, the Court noted that the
Convention does not allow implicit authorization for national courts
to create uniformity between airplane disasters which occur over sea
and those which occur over land. 6
Lastly, the Court rejected Petitioners' argument that the
supplant of DOHSA would result in an unintended "double cap" of
the $75,000 limit per passenger liability (except in cases of willful
misconduct), which when combined with a DOHSA rule prohibiting
compensation for nonpecuniary harm, would not sufficiently deter
willful misconduct.227 The Court noted that the Convention
"unquestionably envisions the application of domestic law" and that
222. 116 S. Ct. at 636. (citing Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409
U.S. 249, 263-4 (1972)).
223. 116 S. Ct. at 636.
224. Id. See generally, Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207,
232-3 (1986) (state law preempted by DOHSA) and Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625-6 (1978) (no loss of society under general
maritime law where DOHSA applicable). The Supreme Court declined to
address the issue of whether § 761 of DOHSA calls into question the district
court's determination that the decedent's mother is the proper party to the suit,
or its grant of a jury trial, and whether § 762 contradicts the district court's
allowance of pain and suffering damages, as KAL challenged none of those
rulings in its petition for certiorari. 116 S. Ct. at 636, n.4.
225. 116 S. Ct. at 636.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 637.
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it is the function of Congress, rather than the Court, to decide that
domestic law provides inadequate deterrence.228
Having concluded that Articles 17 and 24(2) of the
Convention permit compensation only for legally cognizable harm,
leaving the specification of what harm is cognizable to domestic law
applicable under the forum's choice of law rules, the Court held
that DOHSA provides the substantive United States law where the
airline crash occurs on the High Seas.229 Where DOHSA is
applicable, there is no entitlement to damages for loss of society.
20
Consequently, the Court noted that it need not reach the question,
whether under general maritime law, dependency is a prerequisite
for loss of society damages.23'
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Second Circuit's
judgment permitting Zicherman to recover loss of society damages
if she could establish her dependency on the decedent, and affirmed
the judgment vacating the award of loss of society damages to
Mahalek.232
V. ANALYSIS
The Zicherman decision represents an important phase in
Warsaw Convention litigation. Only the fifth case to be decided by
the Court regarding the Convention's applicability, 233 the Zicherman
decision limits the type of damages recoverable under the






233. See generally, Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Chan
v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.




restrictions on recovery for the death of a relative in an
international aviation disaster on the High Seas.
Importantly, the Zicherman decision arguably reverses a
move towards uniform decisionmaking under the Warsaw
Convention as set forth by the Second Circuit in the Lockerbie
cases. While the Second Circuit attempted to create a framework
establishing uniformity for air disasters occurring over either land
or sea, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the creation of a
uniform rule by the judiciary. The Court noted that the place for
creation of such rules lies with the legislators of the contracting
nations. As Justice Scalia pointed out, absent legislation creating
special provisions applicable to Warsaw Convention cases, the
Court must "apply the law that would govern in the absence of the
Convention. ,234
Justice Scalia analyzed the Convention according to its plain
meaning, looking at the language and context of the provisions, the
negotiation and drafting history, and the conduct of the parties.235
Such an analysis enabled the Court to conform to the framers'
intentions of limiting air carriers' liability while addressing
survivors' damages.
Importantly, the Supreme Court cautioned lower courts that
the Warsaw Convention does not empower the creation of "some
common-law rule--under cover of general admiralty law or
otherwise--that will supersede the normal federal disposition. ,236
Such a cautionary note serves as a reminder that the Warsaw
Convention does not authorize creation of an international or federal
common law "in derogation of otherwise applicable law.
237
Rather, the Court noted that the Convention serves only as a "pass-
234. 116 S. Ct. at 636.
235. See supra Part IV.
236. 116 S. Ct. at 636.
237. Id.
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through" which directs courts to apply the law that governs in the
absence of the Convention.238
The Court's rejection of the Second Circuit's more
expansive reading of the Convention to allow loss of society
damages using general maritime law provisions arguably opens the
door on the debate which haunted the Convention's framers during
the early part of this century. Does the Convention's failure to
specify the types of damages available to decedents' survivors
unfairly favor international air carriers?
Some may argue that this is the Convention's greatest
failure, as demonstrated by the Zicherman decision. Importantly,
the Zicherman decision is significant not so much in what it says,
but in what it does not say. While it is true that Zicherman places
great limitations on who may recover under the Convention, it also
poses important questions regarding choice of law issues and
whether the Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive cause of
action in a wrongful death suit.
For example, the Zicherman decision seemingly applies only
to those international air disasters which occur over the High Seas,
in which case the Death on the High Seas Act is the appropriate
substantive law to apply, and recovery is limited accordingly.
However, where the air disaster occurs over land, the scenario is
entirely different, and the Supreme Court does not answer what
substantive law would be appropriate.
Arguably, in cases such as the Lockerbie disaster, where the
incident occurs over land, the ability to recover nonpecunary
damages such as loss of society will depend entirely on the forum's
choice of law rules. As Articles 17 and 24(2) "provide nothing
more than a pass-through," it is unclear what the result will be.
Because the Supreme Court has discarded the Second Circuit's
analysis in the Lockerbie cases, it is likely that courts will be
required to revert to the complicated choice of law analysis referred




earlier.239 In international aviation disaster litigation, jurisdiction
would be predicated on the federal question presented under the
Warsaw Convention, and the federal court would be the forum.24
However, the question still remains as to whether courts should
apply a federal common law choice of law rule or state choice of
law principles in non-diversity cases. Arguably, the Supreme Court
rejected the former in favor of the latter. As a result, much money
will be spent determining choice of law issues, for example, in
cases where a state's or another country's law applies, depending
on issues such as domicile.
Unfortunately, the likely result is that judgments will vary
from state to state, depending on the choice of law rules of each
state. Accordingly, the results for the families of two passengers
sitting next to each other on an ill-fated plane will be entirely
different.
The question of choice of law also affects whether the
Convention is the exclusive remedy for an international aviation
disaster. In Lockerbie I, the Second Circuit: (1) determined that
punitive damages were outside the scope of the Convention; (2)
held that the Convention provides the exclusive remedy for
wrongful death suits; and (3) that plaintiffs' claims for punitive
damages were preempted by the Convention.241 However, it is
unlikely that this interpretation of the Convention will stand, in light
239. See Stephen J. Fearon, Recoverable Damages in Wrongful Death Actions
Governed by the Warsaw Convention, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 367 (July, 1995). As
one commentator has noted, prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Lockerbie,
American courts would conduct an exhaustive choice of law analysis and
apply the wrongful death law of one U.S. state or another (or that of a
foreign country) as the local (substantial) law in such cases. In air disaster
litigation involving numerous plaintiffs from many different states and
country, the result was that the survivors of deceased passengers often
received disparate recoveries, even when their decedents earned similar
incomes, left similar estates and were sitting alongside one another when
death occurred.
Id.
240. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
241. See Lockerbie I, supra, Part III.
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of Zicherman, because damages are determined by the substantive
law of the forum; thus, the source of damages can not be the
Convention itself. 42 Consequently, at least in air disasters over
land, courts will have to turn to states' choice of law rules to
determine what damages are available in cases arising under the
Warsaw Convention. Courts will also need to address whether
dependency must be established to recover damages in actions under
the Convention, as the Supreme Court in Zicherman fails to address
that issue.
Zicherman, while laying to rest the question of damages
available in air disasters over the High Seas, fails to shed light on
the issue of the type of damages available in crashes over land.
VI. CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as the Convention's purpose was to provide
uniform decisions in international air disasters, that goal is unlikely
to be realized, considering the current state of U.S. law interpreting
the Convention. The Supreme Court's decision in Zicherman
portends future problems in the applicability of the Convention's
use. As discussed above, at least in cases involving international
aviation disasters on land, it is not at all clear that the types of
damages recoverable will be uniform from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, as no federal legislation exists to supplement the
Warsaw Convention's provisions.
Accordingly, in light of the Supreme Court's refusal to
fashion a rule to provide for damages in Convention cases, it is the
responsibility of legislators to supplement the Convention by
fashioning legislation which would provide guidance on the types
of damages recoverable and by whom. Until then, the survivors of
those killed in international air crashes will be forced to litigate
these issues.
242. See generally, Kreindler, 'Zicherman' - Methodology in International
Accidents, 215 N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 29, 1996) (critiquing Supreme Court's analysis).
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